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I. INTRODUCTION 
Elliot Rodger viewed Friday, May 24, 2014, as his “day of retribution” as 
he embarked on a violent killing spree throughout the streets of California.1  
Rodger’s massacre left a total of seven victims dead, including himself, on 
the streets neighboring the University of California, Santa Barbara campus.2  
Rodger executed his premeditated, meticulous mass murder with three semi-
automatic handguns, accompanied by 400 rounds of ammunition — all of 
which he legally purchased and registered.3 
As a child, Rodger participated in therapy and received psychiatric drug 
treatment; however, at the age of 18, Rodger refused continued mental 
healthcare.4  Professionals agree that Rodger displayed warning signs 
1. See Kimberly Kindy, Father of Victim in Santa Barbara Shootings to
Politicians: ‘I Don’t Care About Your Sympathy, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/father-of-victim-in-santa-barbara-shootings-
to-politicians-i-dont-care-about-your-sympathy/2014/05/27/8a030d10-e5ad-11e3-a86b-
362fd5443d19_story.html (detailing how Rodger stabbed and shot his victims).   
2. Ralph Ellis & Sara Sidner, Deadly California Rampage: Chilling Video, but No
Match for Reality, CNN (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/24/justice/california-shooting-deaths/ (stating that Rodger 
killed seven, including himself, and injured thirteen others).  
3. See id.
4. L.A. Times Staff Writers, Isla Vista Attacker’s Struggles Didn’t Prevent Gun
Buying, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-in-isla-
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indicating he harbored violent tendencies.5  For example, in Rodger’s 137-
page manifesto, “My Twisted World,” he documented his violent 
propensities including his attempt to push people off of a ledge at a college 
party.6  In April 2014, after discovering her son’s disturbing YouTube 
videos, Rodger’s mother tried to intervene by alerting his former therapist.7  
In response, the therapist reported the incident to the Santa Barbara mental 
health hotline, which dispatched police officers to follow up with Rodger.8  
Rodger admitted to the police officers that he had difficulties socializing with 
his classmates and peers, yet the police determined that his calm, lucid 
behavior did not meet the criteria for an involuntary hold.9  If the officers 
had searched Rodger’s home they would have uncovered three semi-
automatic handguns, 400 rounds of ammunition, and his 137-page manifesto 
plotting his “day of retribution.”10  However, because Rodger maintained a 
clean record and did not meet the criteria for an involuntary commitment for 
mental health treatment, California law did not allow police to intervene or 
remove firearms.11  Further, even if police believed Rodger truly posed a 
threat to himself or others, California law did not permit police to intervene.12 
In response to Rodger’s mass shooting, California politicians recognized 
vista-shooting-suspects-struggle-didnt-prevent-gun-buying-20140526.html 
(emphasizing that he was in a phase of pre-psychosis).  
5. See Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, In Elliot Rodger, Authorities in California
Saw Warning Signs but Didn’t See a Tipping Point, WASH. POST (May 25, 2014), 
http://washingtonpost.com national/sheriff-calif-shooter-rodger-flew-under-the-radar-
when-deputies-visited-him-in-april/2014/05/25/88123026-e3b4-11e3-
8dccd6b7fede081a_story.html.  
6. See id. (detailing Rodger’s violent episodes where he targeted girls whom
Rodger wanted to “punish” for not talking to him). 
7. Caroline Bankoff, UCSB Shooter’s Parents Tried to Stop Him, N.Y. MAG. (May
26, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/05/ucsb-shooters-parents-tried-to-
stop-him.html (explaining that Rodger’s mother noticed and sought to prevent her son’s 
erratic behavior).  
8. See id. (emphasizing Rodger participated in therapy on-and-off since he was
eight years old; in high school, Rodger saw a therapist every day). 
9. See id. (stressing that under California law police officers lacked grounds for a
search because they classified Rodger as normal). 
10. Rucker & Costa, supra note 5 (asserting officers would have found Rodger’s
manifesto detailing his disturbed thoughts). 
11. See J.B. Wogan, After Isla Vista, Lawmakers Want to Take Guns from
Dangerous People, GOVERNING (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-bill-would-allow-police-to-
seize-guns-from-dangerous-people.html (stressing California law is flawed because it 
did not allow police to remove Rodger’s firearms). 
12. Id. (proposing how Assembly Bill 1014 would attempt to repair the flaw in
California law). 
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the problems with California gun laws; particularly, Assemblywoman Nancy 
Skinner affirmed that the Santa Barbara mass shooting illuminated the 
problems with California’s mental health laws, but more importantly, with 
the state’s gun laws.13  Rodger’s massacre prompted California lawmakers 
to create Assembly Bill 1014, which allows police to temporarily seize guns 
from people who pose a threat to themselves or others.14 
This Comment argues that Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on an 
individual’s Second Amendment constitutional right to bear arms because 
the bill is narrowly tailored to prevent gun violence as it targets only 
dangerous individuals.15  Part II discusses Assembly Bill 1014 and 
summarizes the basic principles of Second Amendment jurisprudence.16  Part 
III argues that since the Supreme Court has not yet established an appropriate 
standard for Second Amendment analysis, courts should use First 
Amendment jurisprudence as guidance in determining the appropriate level 
of scrutiny to employ when analyzing Second Amendment claims.17  Part III 
explains how Assembly Bill 1014 survives the requisite intermediate 
scrutiny analysis and further survives strict scrutiny – the highest level of 
scrutiny applied by the courts.18  Part IV recommends that other states should 
consider the impact of gun violence by passing legislation similar to 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014.19  Part V concludes by reiterating that 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 is constitutional because it survives both 
intermediate and strict scrutiny.20 
13. Melanie Mason, Lawmakers Seek ‘Gun Violence Restraining Order’ After
UCSB Slayings, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-
me-pc-gun-violence-restraining-order-20140527-story.html (highlighting that 
legislation surfaced in response to the Santa Barbara shooting).  
14. See Wogan, supra note 11 (noting when people are in a psychological crisis,
those closest can best spot warning signs). 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
16. See infra Part II (discussing the Second Amendment’s historical jurisprudence
and its applicability, using First Amendment framework, to California’s Assembly Bill 
1014). 
17. See infra Part III (analogizing the First Amendment framework with the Second
Amendment, using a one-size-fits-all analysis, arguing that Assembly Bill 1014 passes 
intermediate scrutiny).  
18. See infra Part III (arguing that when applying the First Amendment scrutiny
framework, Assembly Bill 1014 survives both intermediate and strict scrutiny). 
19. See infra Part IV (discussing that in response to our nation’s recent mass
shooting trend, other states should adopt gun violence restraining orders and firearm 
seizure warrants similar to California’s Assembly Bill 1014).  
20. See infra Part V (arguing that extrapolating the First Amendment framework,
Assembly Bill 1014 is constitutional under the Second Amendment). 
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Triggering Factors of Assembly Bill 1014. 
Assembly Bill 1014 creates a procedure for family members to obtain a 
restraining order and firearm seizure warrant against an individual who poses 
significant injury to themselves or others by possessing a firearm.21  A gun 
violence restraining order prohibits an individual from having in his or her 
custody or control, owning, purchasing, or possessing any firearm or 
ammunition.22  A firearm seizure warrant orders a restrained person to 
surrender to local law enforcement all firearms or ammunition in his or her 
custody.23   
In particular, an immediate family member may submit an ex parte request 
to the court setting forth the facts and circumstances convincing the court 
that a gun violence restraining order shall be issued.24  Whether the grounds 
exist to grant a gun violence restraining order will turn on many factors 
including: recent threats or acts of violence, reckless use or display of 
firearms, and history of use, attempted use, or threat of force against others.25  
If a magistrate judge finds probable cause to believe the named person poses 
a threat, the magistrate will issue a gun violence restraining order.26  Further, 
if the individual has current control or custody of firearms, then the 
magistrate may also issue a firearm seizure warrant.27 
After issuing a gun violence restraining order, the court will hold a hearing 
to determine whether the individual may buy or possess firearms.28  During 
the hearing, the State must present clear and convincing evidence that the 
named person poses a significant risk of personal injury to themselves or 
21. A.B 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) emphasizing that
to ensure an individual’s due process right, an individual is entitled to a hearing to 
determine whether a person may own or possess a firearm).   
22. See id. (detailing the renewal process of the order for additional one-year periods
and hearing process to terminate the order). 
23. See id. (explaining how the local law enforcement agency must retain custody
of the firearm and/or ammunition for the duration of a gun violence restraining order). 
24. See id. (stressing an affidavit should set forth the credible facts of violent
behavior or a violent history in order to establish the restraining order’s probable cause). 
25. See id. (considering recent violations of any protective orders and prior arrests
for felony offenses). 
26. Id. (stating whether a magistrate issues a firearm seizure warrant is at the
magistrate’s complete discretion based on the facts established by the government). 
27. Id. (explaining that a seizure warrant requires that a police officer seize any
specified firearms the dangerous individual owns or possesses). 
28. See id. (detailing the hearing must be scheduled no later than twenty-one days
after the firearm seizure). 
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others by owning or possessing the firearm.29  If such risks are proven, 
Assembly Bill 1014 requires law enforcement to retain any firearms for a 
period of up to one year.30  Further, Assembly Bill 1014 would prohibit the 
restrained individual from owning, possessing, receiving or attempting to 
receive a firearm.31  Assembly Bill 1014 would authorize, upon probable 
cause, either a law enforcement agency or judge to file a motion to request a 
gun violence restraining order renewal.32  Since Assembly Bill 1014 involves 
firearm restrictions, its constitutionality under the Second Amendment will 
undoubtedly be questioned.33 
B. Establishing the Second Amendment Baseline: District of Columbia v. 
Heller. 
The Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.34  
More specifically, courts recognize that at the core of the Second 
Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to bear firearms 
in the home for self-defense.35  In 2008, the Supreme Court struck down the 
District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of handguns in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.36  For the first time, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
Second Amendment’s protections, scope, and limitations.37  The Court began 
by analyzing the Second Amendment’s Operative Clause that codifies a 
29. Id. (stressing that the state carries the burden of proof).
30. See id. (explaining that an individual found as a significant risk of injury may
file a written appeal). 
31. Id. (noting that the total time of the firearm restraint should also not exceed one
year, however, can be renewed). 
32. See id. (underlining that only with probable cause to believe that a person
continues to pose a significant risk of personal injury to him, herself or others will a 
judge grant this motion). 
33. See id. (acknowledging critics will attack the Bill’s constitutionality under
Heller); Patrick McGreevy, Governor Oks Temporary Gun Seizures from People Judged 
to be a Danger, L.A. Times (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-
me-pc-california-jerry-brown-gun-seizures-20140929-story.html (“Without a doubt, AB 
1014 is one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties ever introduced in the 
California Legislature.”). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
35. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
Heller established the core of the Second Amendment as a citizen’s right to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home).  
36. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the
District of Columbia’s blanket ban on handgun possession prohibits law-abiding citizens 
from lawfully possessing a firearm in the home for the purpose of immediate self-
defense).  
37. See id. (establishing the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense). 
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“right of the people,” stressing that this right belongs to all Americans.38  The 
Court analyzed the expansive meaning behind “the right to keep and bear 
Arms.”39  Additionally, the Court, while analogizing it to the First 
Amendment, held that the Second Amendment extends to all arms, even 
those not in existence at the time of the Second Amendment’s founding.40  
After piecing together the textual elements of the Operative Clause, the Court 
found that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the “right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”41 
Indeed, the Second Amendment confers an individual the right to bear 
arms; however, courts recognize that this right is not unlimited.42  
Particularly, the Second Amendment does not extend to all citizens the right 
to carry arms for any manner or purpose.43  The Court cautioned that though 
the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms, nothing about the 
Court’s opinion should cast doubt on the long-standing prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,44 or laws forbidding 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.45 
In Heller, the Court struck down the gun ban in the District of Columbia 
after emphasizing the Second Amendment’s inherent right of self-defense in 
the home.46  Unlike most jurisprudence analyzing an individual’s 
fundamental right, the Court did not employ a specific level of scrutiny in 
establishing the law’s constitutionality.47  The Court, however, established 
38. See id. at 579-81.
39. Id. at 581 (noting the phrase applies to weapons not specifically designed for
military use and capacity). 
40. Id. at 582 (comparing the Second and Fourth Amendment, stating just as the
Fourth Amendment protects modern forms of search, the Second Amendment applies to 
any and all instruments that constitute bearable arms).  
41. Id. at 592 (noting that the meaning of the Second Amendment is strongly
supported by the amendment’s historical background). 
42. See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (drawing the
parallel between the First and Second Amendment noting though the right is protective, 
not unlimited). 
43. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (stressing the Second Amendment does not allow
citizens the right to carry arms for any confrontation).  
44. Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45
CONN. L. REV. 813, 853 (2013) (noting the Heller Court correctly limits the right to bear 
arms from the mentally ill). 
45. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting the Court did not invalidate many of the
longstanding state and federal prohibitions on firearm possession). 
46. See id. at 628 (establishing that the ban impinges on an individual’s inherent
right of self-defense by banning an entire class of arms that society uses for lawful 
purposes).  
47. Id. at 628-29. (noting the Court did not specify a level of scrutiny because under
any level of scrutiny a complete ban of handguns from the home would fail constitutional 
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that courts going forward could not analyze the Second Amendment under a 
rational basis review because the low burden would render the Second 
Amendment ineffective.48  Though the Court rejected the rational basis test, 
the Court neither established, nor hinted, at how future courts should review 
Second Amendment claims.49  Instead, the Court held that under either strict 
or intermediate scrutiny, the complete ban of handguns – the most preferred 
firearm – in the home, would fail any constitutional analysis.50  In effect, the 
Court held the Second Amendment rises above any interests in a law-
abiding, responsible citizen’s right to use arms in defense of “hearth and 
home.”51  Thus, the Court concluded that the District of Columbia’s ban on 
handgun possession violated the Second Amendment because it prohibited 
law-abiding citizens from possessing any lawful firearm in the home for the 
purpose of self-defense.52 
C. Analyzing the Constitutionality of City and State Ordinances Under the 
Second Amendment. 
Although the Court in Heller established a list of long-standing firearm 
regulations that did not infringe on a person’s Second Amendment right, the 
Court did not establish how future courts should review Second Amendment 
claims.53  When determining the level of scrutiny to use in Second 
Amendment jurisprudence, most courts analogize to the First Amendment.54  
Particularly, the court in United States v. Chovan looked to the First 
muster). 
48. See id. at 628 n.27 (explaining that if all that was required to overcome the right
to bear arms was rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant and have 
no effect).  
49. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 2010) (asserting the
Heller court did not establish the proper level of scrutiny because the ban would fail 
under any constitutional muster). 
50. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (noting that the District of Columbia’s ban
disables individuals to protect one’s home and family and such would be unconstitutional 
under any standards of scrutiny that we have applied to other constitutional rights).  
51. Id. at 635; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010)
(noting the Amendment must protect the right of law-abiding citizens to own guns for 
lawful purposes). 
52. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (stressing the right to self-defense in an individual’s
home is at the core, a law-abiding citizen’s Second Amendment right). 
53. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding
McDonald established self-defense as fundamental and as the central component of the 
individual right to bear arms); see also United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 
(9th Cir. 2013) (noting the Heller court did determine that rational basis review would 
render the Second Amendment redundant, and thus inappropriate for Second 
Amendment analysis).   
54. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138.
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Amendment when analyzing a law that prohibited domestic violence 
misdemeanants and held that the degree of judicial scrutiny depends on the 
degree of burden placed on the fundamental right.55  Further, the court in 
United States v. Marzzarella also used the First Amendment’s framework to 
decide whether a Second Amendment claim should be analyzed under strict 
or intermediate scrutiny.56 
Additionally, courts analyzing the Second Amendment can follow the 
court’s analysis in Ezell v. City of Chicago by extrapolating the First 
Amendment framework.57  Using the framework, courts should conclude 
that a severe burden on the Second Amendment will require a “strong public 
interest justification” while activity and laws merely regulating gun 
possession, rather than restricting, may be more easily justified.58  As 
illustrated in Chovan and Marzzarella, courts may look towards the First 
Amendment jurisprudence and employ either strict or intermediate scrutiny 
to a Second Amendment claim.59 
1. Intermediate Scrutiny
When a statute’s place and manner restrictions serve a governmental
interest and do not substantially burden the right to possess a firearm for self-
defense, courts will review the Second Amendment claim under intermediate 
scrutiny.60  For example, when analyzing the law banning gun possession for 
domestic violence misdemeanants, the court in United States v. Chester 
stated when applying intermediate scrutiny that:  (1) the government’s 
objective must be important, and (2) there must be a reasonable fit between 
the regulation and the asserted objective.61  The court in United States v. 
55. Id. (stating that along with the burden, courts sometimes look towards the
specific iteration of the right). 
56. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
while analyzing the constitutionality of a ban of firearms with destroyed serial numbers, 
the court declared that courts should apply the First Amendment framework to Second 
Amendment claims). 
57. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (analogizing the
First Amendment to the Second Amendment, stating time, place, and manner restrictions 
need only be reasonable and justified). 
58. See id.
59. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (noting that similar to the First Amendment
context, the level of scrutiny in the Second Amendment context should depend on the 
nature of the conduct being regulated and to the degree which the challenged law burdens 
the right); see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97-98 (extrapolating the First Amendment 
framework). 
60. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (recognizing the law may not significantly impair
an individual’s right of firearm possession in the home). 
61. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating the
9
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Masciandro noted that a law does not need to be the least intrusive means of 
achieving the government objective.62 
The court in Chester applied intermediate scrutiny to a West Virginia law 
that banned domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms and 
justified the use of intermediate scrutiny since the ban served the interest of 
restraining non-law-abiding citizens’ gun possession.63  Similarly, the court 
in United States v. Skoien applied the same analysis as the Chester court to 
a domestic violent misdemeanant.64 
2. Strict Scrutiny
Courts review Second Amendment claims under strict scrutiny only when
a restriction imposes a substantial burden on the ability of a law-abiding 
citizen to possess a firearm for self-defense.65  The court in Chovan explained 
that courts weigh the severity of the law’s burden against a narrowly tailored 
governmental interest.66  As the court in New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Associations v. Cuomo explained, courts will define a regulation as a severe 
burden when a regulation fails to leave open ample alternative channels.67 
For example, the court in Decastro recognized that although the New York 
law prohibiting anyone except for licensed importers from transporting 
firearms burdened citizens’ Second Amendment right, the law left ample 
alternative means of possessing a firearm.68  For a regulation to survive strict 
scrutiny, the regulation must be narrowly tailored.69  A narrowly tailored 
government has the burden of showing there is a reasonable fit, not perfect fit, between 
the challenged regulation and a substantial governmental interest).  
62. See United States v. Masciandro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011)
(acknowledging the fit of the law’s burden need not be perfect, rather, a reasonable fit to 
the governmental interest). 
63. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (banning domestic violence misdemeanants right
to possess firearms). 
64. See United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the law
placed a blanket ban only on all individuals convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanors).  
65. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008) (explaining the
Second Amendment applies strictly to only law-abiding, responsible citizens). 
66. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining
how courts should determine the appropriate level of scrutiny using the First Amendment 
framework). 
67. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 367
(W.D.N.Y. 2013) (specifying laws cannot place a complete, blanket ban on firearms but 
must leave open alternative channels).  
68. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding the
regulation left open alternative means of firearm possession and thus was constitutional). 
69. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on 
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restriction “requires that the regulation actually advance the compelling 
interest it is designed to serve.”70  For example, the Marzzarella court held 
that the law prohibiting firearms with obliterated serial numbers survived 
strict scrutiny because the law was narrowly tailored to serve the interest of 
tracing firearms by prohibiting possession of untraceable firearms.71 
III. ANALYSIS
A. When Selecting the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny For Second 
Amendment Claims, Courts Should Adopt the First Amendment Framework 
Because the Second Amendment Is Subject to a One-Size-Fits-All Level of 
Scrutiny. 
1. Courts Should Use the First Amendment As a Guide When Analyzing
Second Amendment Claims. 
As the Heller court failed to establish the appropriate framework for 
Second Amendment claims, courts now look towards the First Amendment 
for guidance.72  When determining the applicable framework for First 
Amendment cases, courts must first determine how close the regulation or 
restriction comes to the core of an individual’s fundamental right.73  For 
example, the Heller court acknowledged that some federal gun laws and 
regulations ultimately survive analysis because they regulate activity outside 
of the Second Amendment’s intended scope.74  However, if the government 
cannot establish that the regulated activity falls outside the scope, judicial 
review will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the 
amendment’s guaranteed right and the severity of the burden on that right.75  
the Amendment). 
70. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that a law that burdens a significant amount of protected conduct while not implicating 
the government interest is evidence that a regulation is insufficiently tailored).  
71. See id. at 99-101 (arguing obliterated serial numbers on firearms lead to
untraceable firearms, thus prohibiting obliterated serial numbers allows the government 
to properly track the firearms). 
72. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing
that the two frameworks are similar because of the similarities between the scope and 
context of the First Amendment and the Second Amendment).   
73. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (stating courts focus on how the law burdens the
core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of such burden). 
74. See Ezell, 651 F.3d 702-03 (noting that if the law falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment, the analysis ends; therefore, the regulated activity is unprotected). 
75. See generally id. (asserting that if the government cannot establish the law is
unprotected, then the second inquiry is how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right). 
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Just as other constitutional rights can adopt a one-size-fits-all standard of 
review, so can the Second Amendment.76  Using the framework carved out 
by courts analyzing First Amendment challenges, the level of scrutiny in a 
Second Amendment context should likewise depend on:  (1) how close the 
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity 
of the law’s burden on the right.77  In effect, the Second Amendment can 
extrapolate the First Amendment’s framework by concluding that a severe 
burden on the Second Amendment will require a strong public interest 
justification while laws merely regulating, not restricting, may be more 
easily justified.78 
2. Assembly Bill 1014 Does Not Severely Burden an Individual’s Right to
Bear Arms Because the Bill Does Not Apply to Responsible, Law-Abiding 
Citizens; therefore, Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny. 
As the Second Amendment jurisprudence has not yet drawn the important 
distinctions between the application of intermediate and strict scrutiny based 
on the restriction’s target, many courts rightfully look towards First 
Amendment analysis and jurisprudence for guidance.79  For example, the 
court in Ezell followed the First Amendment to determine the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to analyze Chicago’s ordinance banning all firing ranges in 
the city.80  The court analogized election law cases where laws imposing 
severe burdens apply strict scrutiny, whereas “more modest regulatory 
measures need only be reasonable, politically neutral, and justified by an 
76. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
Second Amendment regulations impose varying degrees of burden on individual 
assertions of the right; thus, susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review by using 
the framework of other fundamental rights analysis). 
77. See id. at 682; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703 (establishing the framework courts should
apply to Second Amendment challenges). 
78. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (demonstrating the different levels of scrutiny in First
Amendment jurisprudence using commercial-speech cases as an example; specifically 
explaining that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to review the subordinate position that 
commercial speech occupies in the scale of the First Amendment values).  
79. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)
(explaining that the First Amendment contains the right of freedom-of-speech that 
includes specific exceptions for speech outside its scope, and the Second Amendment is 
no different).  
80. Compare Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (highlighting in First Amendment
jurisprudence, focusing on public benefits, courts will apply intermediate scrutiny after 
noting that restrictions in adult bookstores have public benefits justifying any curtailment 
of speech), with Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 
when analyzing election laws, courts will apply strict scrutiny only where the right to 
vote is subjected to “severe restrictions”).  
12
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important governmental interest.”81  It follows that California’s Assembly 
Bill 1014 should be analyzed by critics and analysts under the First 
Amendment jurisprudence to determine the appropriate framework and level 
of scrutiny.82  Under First Amendment analysis, unlike the regulation in Ezell 
that placed a blanket ban on firearm activity or firearm possession, Assembly 
Bill 1014 modestly regulates gun possession for a period not to exceed one-
year.83  Further, Assembly Bill 1014 does not come into effect unless there 
is probable cause, supported later by clear and convincing evidence, to 
believe one is a risk to himself or others.84  Therefore, the bill does not 
regulate an individual’s firearm possession unless he or she is proven to be 
a dangerous individual.85  In effect, because Assembly Bill 1014 merely 
places a moderate, temporary burden on only a dangerous, irresponsible 
individual’s Second Amendment right, the First Amendment jurisprudence 
analysis points toward applying intermediate scrutiny.86  Essentially, because 
the strength of the government interest must reflect the seriousness of the 
actual, modern burden on the constitutional right, applying intermediate 
scrutiny, rather than strict, is justified.87  Because Assembly Bill 1014 aims 
at serving the governmental interest of preventing mass shootings, suicides, 
and other tragedies while placing a moderate burden on an individual’s 
Second Amendment right, intermediate scrutiny should be applied.88 
When reviewing and analyzing different degrees of scrutiny under the 
Second Amendment, courts generally recognize that the Second Amendment 
81. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 707 (noting many courts have said that First Amendment
framework is analogous for Second Amendment claims). 
82. See id. at 708 (stating that courts can distill the First Amendment doctrine and
extrapolate a few general principles applicable to the Second Amendment context). 
83. See A.B. 1014 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stressing that
if one poses a significant risk of personal injury, law enforcement can retain the person’s 
firearms for a period not exceeding one year).   
84. See id. (emphasizing that Assembly Bill does not target law-abiding, responsible
citizens, rather, only dangerous individuals). 
85. See id. (targeting only those individuals who demonstrate a propensity to
commit violence toward themselves or others). 
86. See generally id. §§ 18175(b)(1), 18185(b)(noting there is a high burden to
prove that an individual’s firearms should be restrained). 
87. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703-08 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying
intermediate scrutiny requires a court to measure the burden the law places on an 
individual’s right and whether the burden is tailored to an important governmental 
interest).   
88. Ian Lovett, California Will Allow Family Members to Seek Seizure of Guns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), http://wwww.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/us/california-will-allow-
family-members-to-seek-seizure-of-guns.html (stressing Assembly Bill 1014 allows 
family members to intervene before a shooting tragedy occurs).  
13
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is susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of fundamental right review.89  
In Chester, the court examined the constitutionality of a West Virginia law, 
which banned those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from 
possessing firearms.90  Using the First Amendment framework, the court 
stated that the level of scrutiny depends on the nature of the regulated 
conduct and the degree of which the law burdens a law-abiding, responsible 
right.91  Specifically, a court should also acknowledge that as in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, content-neutral time, place, and manner 
regulations should trigger intermediate scrutiny.92  A court examining 
Assembly Bill 1014 should analogize the bill to Chester because the bill in 
question also regulates a non-law-abiding citizen.93  Similar to the law in 
Chester, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 strictly targets regulating 
irresponsible, dangerous individuals.94  As the law in Chester applies to 
convicted domestic violence misdemeanants,95 Assembly Bill 1014 similarly 
targets only dangerous individuals who, like domestic violence 
misdemeanants, prove to be a threat to themselves or others.96  Thus, guided 
by the First Amendment framework, courts should employ intermediate 
scrutiny when analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 because the bill reasonably 
restricts the manner in which only dangerous individuals may possess 
89. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining gun-
control regulations impose varying degrees of burdens on Second Amendment rights; 
thus, similar to other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment is susceptible to a 
one-size-fits all standard of review (citing United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-
14 (7th Cir. 2009).   
90. Id. at 677-78 (explaining that the lower court compared the law to lawful
regulations, such as longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons, in 
finding the restriction a lawful exercise of governmental regulation).  
91. See id. at 682 (exemplifying that content-based speech restrictions on
noncommercial speech must satisfy strict scrutiny). 
92. Id.; see also Skoien, 587 F.3d at 813-14 (emphasizing that laws may be more
easily justified if they merely regulate rather than restrict, and that laws posing modest 
burdens on a right may be more easily justified).  
93. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (holding because the appellant was not a law-
abiding citizen that the law regulating the manner of gun possession called for 
intermediate scrutiny).  
94. See A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stressing that
Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a procedure to obtain a gun violence restraining order 
and seizure warrant when a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to 
themselves or others).  
95. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 677 (stating Congress aimed at keeping firearms out of
the hands of dangerous misdemeanants). 
96. See Cal. A.B. 1014 § 18155(b) (highlighting that magistrates should look
towards recent threats, acts of violence towards the named person and others, reckless 
use or display of firearms, and attempted threat or threatened use of physical force).  
14
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firearms.97 
A court examining Assembly Bill 1014 should also look to the court’s 
First Amendment analysis in Skoien for direction.98  Similar to Chester, the 
appellant in Skoien challenged state law, which placed a blanket ban on 
firearm possession on those convicted of a domestic-violence 
misdemeanor.99  Essentially, a court should also look to the First Amendment 
jurisprudence and recognize that levels of scrutiny fluctuate with the 
character and degree of a challenged law’s burden on the right.100  
Specifically, because the law merely regulates rather than places a blanket 
ban, or wholly restricts firearm possession, intermediate scrutiny should 
apply.101  Because the appellant was a convicted domestic violence 
misdemeanant, the court compared the appellant to a convicted felon, 
holding that the appellant was not a law-abiding, responsible citizen, and 
thus applied intermediate scrutiny.102  Similar to the regulation in Skoien, 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 aims at unarming dangerous individuals; 
though the restricted individuals are not formally convicted of a crime, they 
are still considered irresponsible citizens because they have proven a 
propensity to commit violence.103 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 does not place a blanket ban on any and 
everyone’s firearm possession, rather, the bill regulates an irresponsible, 
dangerous person’s possession for a short one-year period.104  Further, to 
even potentially regulate an individual, a court must provide clear and 
convincing evidence that an individual is a danger to themselves or others.105  
97. See generally Cal. A.B. 1014.
98. See  United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting dispute
arose over misdemeanant’s shotgun possession). 
99. See id. at 805 (noting the dispute arose over a convicted domestic violence
misdemeanant’s possession of a shotgun). 
 100.  Id. at 813 (recognizing the fluctuating differences between various types of 
speech protections under the First Amendment).  
 101.  See id. (stating that laws that merely regulate, rather than completely restrict and 
implicate, the central self-defense concern of the Second Amendment, should use 
intermediate scrutiny).  
 102.  See id. at 810, 814 (stressing intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because the 
appellant’s challenge does not implicate the core Second Amendment right of armed 
self-defense implicated in Heller).  
 103.  Compare Skoien, 587 F.3d at 805 (restraining irresponsible, convicted domestic 
violence misdemeanants from possessing a firearm), with A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 
2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (underlining the high burden the government must 
show to prove an individual is a significant risk of injury to themselves or others).  
104.  Cal. A.B. 1014 (emphasizing the period shall not exceed one year). 
 105.  See id. (specifying the state has a high burden of proof when arguing a 
magistrate shall grant a gun violence restraining order and firearm seizure warrant).  
15
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Moreover, the court must hold a hearing to determine if a person is truly a 
threat to themselves or others.106  Because California’s Assembly Bill 1014 
simply regulates, rather than places a blanket ban or wholly restricts, 
dangerous individual’s possession of firearms, courts should apply 
intermediate scrutiny.107 
B. Assembly Bill 1014 Passes Intermediate Scrutiny Because the Bill 
Reasonably Regulates the Time and Manner in Which Dangerous, 
Threatening People Possess Firearms, Thus Aiming to Serve the 
Government’s Compelling Interest in Preventing Gun Violence and Mass 
Shootings. 
For a Second Amendment claim to survive intermediate scrutiny, the law 
must state an important governmental interest and support a fit between the 
challenged regulation and asserted objective.108  As discussed above, the 
court in Chovan applied intermediate scrutiny to California’s law that barred 
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes from 
possessing any firearms.109  Under intermediate scrutiny, the government 
stressed its important interest in preventing gun violence by detaining 
firearms from those who will most likely misuse them.110  Further, the 
government argued it’s interest in preventing domestic gun violence 
altogether.111  A court analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 should draw from the 
Chovan court’s analysis and hold that the law survives intermediate scrutiny 
for numerous reasons; however, most importantly, because the law sought to 
reach the people not merely based on their status as convicted felons, but 
those who demonstrated violence and irresponsibility.112 
 106.  See id. (stressing if the state does not establish clear and convincing evidence 
that the named person is a threat to themselves or others, the seized firearms should be 
returned to the named person).  
 107.  See id. (targeting only individuals that prove to possess a propensity of violence 
and are a significant threat of physical injury to themselves or others); see e.g., N.Y. State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356-57 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(regulating the amount of magazines an individual can purchase).  
 108.  See generally United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(stressing the fit must not be perfect, but rather, reasonable). 
 109.  See id. at 1138 (using the First Amendment framework to establish the burden 
the statute placed on a domestic violence misdemeanant’s Second Amendment right). 
 110.  See id. at 1139 (arguing that the law advances the important governmental 
interest of preventing gun violence in general by banning possession by irresponsible 
individuals).  
 111.  See id. (finding that the assembly bill reasonably fits the government’s important 
governmental interest, thus surviving intermediate scrutiny).   
 112.  Id. at 1140 (holding that keeping guns from domestic violence misdemeanants 
is substantially related to the broader interest of preventing domestic gun violence and, 
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Similar to the law in Chovan, which served the important governmental 
interest of reducing domestic violence and gun violence, the government in 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 similarly seeks to keep guns out of the 
hands of unpredictable, violent individuals.113  Thus, California’s Assembly 
Bill 1014 is analogous to the law in Chovan by aiming at keeping firearms 
out of the hands of those who will most likely misuse them.114  In particular, 
Assembly Bill 1014 is designed to further achieve the governmental interest 
by allowing concerned immediate family members to intervene and 
potentially prohibit firearm possession in an attempt to prevent tragedies 
such as the Isla Vista shooting.115  There are currently no California laws that 
provide a mechanism to limit firearm access to an individual who seeks, 
needs, or receives mental health services.116  Assembly Bill 1014 aims to fill 
this gap by attempting to prevent tragedies stemming from gun violence and 
mass shootings.117  Similar to the law in Chovan, as the bill only targets 
violent individuals who prove themselves as risks, Assembly Bill 1014 
provides a reasonable fit to the government’s objective of preventing gun 
violence, and thus survives intermediate scrutiny.118 
therefore, survives intermediate scrutiny). But see United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 
673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (highlighting that scholars disagree to the extent to which felons, 
let alone misdemeanants, were considered excluded from the right to bear arms). 
 113.  See generally A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) 
(targeting only those who are a significant risk of injury to themselves or others); see 
also Mason, supra note 13 (noting that the state proposal borrows heavily from existing 
state laws pertaining to domestic violence intended to protect victims).  
 114.  See Cal. A.B. 1014 (aiming to restrain those who are a risk of injury to 
themselves or others from using firearms).  
 115.  See id. § 18150(a)(1) (noting that an “immediate family” means any “spouse, 
parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, 
or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six 
months, regularly resided in the household.”); see also Press Release, Cal. State 
Assembly, Assembly Members Nancy Skinner, Das Williams Announce Legislation in 
Wake of Santa Barbara Shooting (May 27, 2014) (on file with author) (arguing that 
parents who try to intervene, like Rodger’s mother, deserve an effective tool to help 
prevent tragedies). 
 116.  See Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (noting that existing law 
only prohibits firearm purchase, sale, or possession for those under domestic violence 
protective orders). 
 117.  See id. (criticizing current legislation and stating that because Rodger neither 
committed a crime nor met the criteria for involuntary treatment, the purchase and 
possession of firearms remained unpreventable).  
 118.  Compare United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(emphasizing that Congress sought to close the dangerous loophole by establishing a 
policy of zero gun violence tolerance and passing a law strictly to prevent domestic gun 
violence), with Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (highlighting that the 
bill fits the government’s objective because when an individual is in a crisis the people 
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Although when analyzing a claim under intermediate scrutiny the 
government must establish a fit between a statute’s means and its end, the fit 
need not be perfect, but rather, only reasonable.119  The court in Chester 
acknowledged the reasonable fit standard while analyzing a West Virginia’s 
law barring domestic violence misdemeanants under intermediate 
scrutiny.120  Although the court recognized the government’s offer to show 
why the disarmament of domestic violence misdemeanants substantially 
relates to an important governmental goal, the court concluded that the 
government did not offer sufficient evidence to establish a relationship 
between the statute and its stated goal.121  Unlike the government in Chester, 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a reasonable, in fact, almost 
perfect fit between the government’s important interest and a regulation.122  
In particular, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 establishes a procedure to 
keep firearms out of the hands of the main problem:  potentially dangerous, 
threatening, and violent individuals.123  Assemblywoman Nancy Skinner 
introduced the bill in response to the UCSB shooting, stating that parents 
such as Rodger’s deserve an effective tool that they can utilize to help 
prevent such tragedies.124  In Rodger’s situation, Rodger’s mother 
recognized that her son was a dangerous, violent, and threatening individual 
and she attempted, but failed, to intervene.125  California’s Assembly Bill 
closest to him or her can spot the warning signs and prevent him or her from buying or 
possessing a firearm). 
 119.  See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(stressing the law need not be the best disposition but the scope is proportional to the 
interest).  
 120.  See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (stressing 
courts will not apply strict scrutiny whenever a law impinges upon a right specifically 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights).  
 121.  Id. at 683 (holding that the restriction did not survive intermediate scrutiny 
because the government failed to establish a reasonable fit between the important object 
of reducing domestic gun violence and the statute’s permanent disbarment of all 
domestic violence misdemeanants).  
 122.  See Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (explaining that family 
members can intervene and prevent mass shootings and future tragedies).  
 123.  See generally  A.B. 1014, Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) 
(establishing a procedure to obtain a gun violence restraining order and a firearm seizure 
warrant when a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to himself or others).  
 124.  Id. (stressing the bill allows use of information brought forth by relatives or 
friends to determine eligibility for a gun violence restraining order); see also Press 
Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (noting that currently there is nothing to 
prevent a threatening individual from purchasing or possessing firearms, but tragedies 
create opportunities for legislators to reform proposals). 
 125.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 § 18150(a) (allowing parents to bring forward 
claims of individuals who pose a significant risk of injury to themselves or others); see 
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1014 would provide parents, such as Rodger’s mother, with the opportunity 
to seek help from the court.126  California’s Assembly Bill 1014 serves to 
prevent gun violence and tragic mass-shootings, demonstrating that the bill 
is reasonably tailored and ultimately survives intermediate scrutiny.127 
To survive intermediate scrutiny, courts rely on substantial evidence that 
fairly supports the government’s rationale in passing the law.128  For 
example, the government in Cuomo had the burden of establishing that New 
York had a substantial interest in public safety and crime prevention to 
uphold its ban on assault weapons referred to in the SAFE Act.129 In finding 
that the statute survived intermediate scrutiny, the court recognized New 
York’s exhaustive study of shootings in America, citing mass shootings in 
the last thirty years where shooters used assault weapons.130  Similar to New 
York’s SAFE Act, California’s Assembly Bill 1014, stemming from the 
proliferation of mass shootings in the last decade, aims to prevent mass 
shootings by keeping weapons out of dangerous hands.131  California’s 
Assembly Bill 1014 compares to New York’s SAFE Act because the bill 
narrowly focuses on gun violence prevention by intervening during a critical 
psychological period by restricting access to firearms.132  The bill encourages 
concerned family members to warn law enforcement of dangerous 
individuals, and thus it aims to prevent gun violence by keeping firearms out 
of the hands of dangerous individuals.133  Because California’s Assembly 
also Mason, supra note 13 (stating Rodger’s mother contacted mental health 
professionals regarding her son’s conditions, but they could not remove his firearms).  
 126.  Mason, supra note 13 (noting that people deserve an effective tool they can act 
on to help prevent these types of tragedies).   
 127.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating if a magistrate finds probable cause to 
believe the named individual is dangerous or a significant risk to others, the magistrate 
shall issue both a firearm seizure warrant and a gun violence restraining order).  
 128.  See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 368 
(W.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing whether New York provided substantial evidence to 
support their ban on assault weapons). 
 129.  See generally id. (noting New York had to prove evidence without deference 
that supports their rationale for their ban).  
 130.  Id. at 371 (finding that New York satisfied its burden to demonstrate a 
substantial link between the regulation and the compelling interest of public safety it 
sought to advance).   
 131.  Compare id. (finding that New York satisfied its burden by demonstrating a 
substantial link, based on reasonably relevant evidence, between the SAFE Act’s 
regulation of assault weapons and compelling interest of public safety), with Cal. A.B. 
1014 (emerging from the Santa Barbara shooting and serving the compelling interest of 
preventing gun violence).  
 132.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (going beyond federal standards to keep firearms 
out of the hands of threatening, dangerous individuals).  
133.  See id. (explaining a gun violence restraining order prohibits a named person 
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Bill 1014 serves the important, compelling governmental interest of 
preventing mass shootings and is reasonably tailored to keep firearms out of 
dangerous hands, Assembly Bill 1014 survives intermediate scrutiny.134 
C. Not Only Does California’s Assembly Bill 1014 Satisfy Intermediate 
Scrutiny, But the Bill Also Survives Strict Scrutiny Because the Bill 
Narrowly Restricts Dangerous Citizens Aiming to Serve the Compelling 
Governmental Interest to Prevent Gun Violence and Mass Shootings. 
Courts should review Second Amendment claims under strict scrutiny 
only when a restriction creates a substantial burden and significantly 
interferes with the ability of a law-abiding, responsible citizens possession 
and use of firearms for self-defense.135  A restriction creates a substantial 
burden when it burdens a protected interest un-proportionally to the statute’s 
asserted governmental interest.136  In Heller, the District of Columbia 
enforced a blanket handgun ban ultimately prohibiting the possession and 
registration of handguns.137  Further, the District of Columbia required that 
residents keep any lawfully obtained firearms unloaded and dissembled.138  
Consequentially, the law at issue completely banned handgun possession in 
the home, and in effect, placed a blanket prohibition on an entire class of 
firearms.139  Scholars and politicians heavily criticized the law because the 
prohibition extended to the home, where the need for self-defense of property 
from having under his or her custody and control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or 
receiving firearms).  
 134.  See Carissa Quiambao, Gun Control Bill Moves Through State Senate, DAILY
NEXUS (July 1, 2014), http://dailynexus.com/2014-07-01/gun-control-bill-moves-
through-state-senate/ (stressing Assembly Bill 1014 aims at preventing an incident such 
as the Isla Vista shooting).   
 135.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (stressing courts 
should only use strict scrutiny when a statute burdens an interest in such a way that is out 
of proportion to the salutary effects upon other governmental interests); see also id. at 
688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (clarifying that rational-basis cannot be used for Second 
Amendment cases because the laws which seek to prevent gun violence bear at least a 
“rational relationship” to a “legitimate” governmental objective).  
 136.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; see also Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 
2011) (declaring strict scrutiny necessary when laws significantly interfere with a 
fundamental right).  
 137.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 574-75 (noting the District of Columbia prohibited 
registration of handguns and possession of unregistered handguns outlawed the 
possession of any handgun).  
 138.  See id. at 575 (providing that firearms do not need to be unloaded and 
dissembled when located in a place of business or used for recreational activities).  
 139.  Id. at 576 (stressing that the type of firearm restricted is mostly used for lawful 
purposes). 
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and family is imperative.140  Although the Court acknowledged the Second 
Amendment’s limitations, the Court also recognized that the law protects the 
fundamental right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home.141  The Court explained that under any level of scrutiny, 
an ultimate ban of handguns142 would fail constitutional analysis.143  A law 
restricting the possession of all firearms in all homes for any law-abiding 
citizen would surely fail any level of scrutiny, therefore, Assembly Bill 1014 
contrasts the burden in Heller.144  Unlike the law in Heller, California’s 
Assembly Bill 1014 narrowly targets and only applies to irresponsible, 
violent individuals rather than applying to all law-abiding, responsible 
citizens like Heller.145  Further, rather than placing a complete blanket 
prohibition on firearms like the law in Heller, Assembly Bill 1014 only 
temporarily seizes a potentially dangerous individual’s firearms for a time 
not exceeding one year.146  Additionally, Assembly Bill 1014 provides 
individuals a safeguard by requiring a hearing to determine whether one 
poses a significant risk to themselves or others before restraining one’s 
firearms.147 
Critics may argue Assembly Bill 1014 is unconstitutional because the bill 
removes the ability for an individual to possess firearms in the home — a 
critical, acute area for self-defense.148  However, interpreting the Second 
Amendment precedent in such a way would ignore a crucial factor in the 
140.  Id. at 628 (noting protection of the home, property, and family is most acute). 
 141.  Id. at 635; see also Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(stating the court in Heller established the inherent right of self-defense is central to the 
Second Amendment right). 
 142.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (underlining the ban prohibits the nation’s 
preferred firearm, handguns, to protect the home). 
 143.  Id. at 629 (emphasizing that few laws in the nation’s history came close to the 
severe restrictions, such as the District of Columbia’s blanket ban on handguns).   
 144.  See id. at 635 (stressing the District’s law as unconstitutional because the law 
infringed the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense). 
 145.  Compare id. (emphasizing that the law placed an unconstitutionally blanket 
prohibition on law-abiding, responsible citizens’ handgun possession), with Cal. A.B. 
1014 (targeting only persons who are proven to be irresponsible, dangerous, and a threat 
to themselves or others).   
 146.  See Cal. A.B. 1014 (asserting that a person’s firearms may be seized for a period 
not to exceed one year; however, after one year, if the person is still a threat to others, 
the seizure may be renewed for a second year).  
 147.  See generally id. (requiring a hearing, after a temporary restraining order has 
been issued, where the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an 
individual poses a significant risk to themselves or others).  
 148.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasizing the home is where the need for self-
defense, property, and family is most acute and banning firearms from the home would 
fail any constitutional muster).  
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analysis – namely, the Second Amendment applies to only law-abiding, 
responsible citizens.149  Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on the rights 
of the every day, average, responsible citizens; rather, the bill strictly focuses 
on irresponsible individuals who prove by clear and convincing evidence a 
propensity for violence and a threat to themselves or others.150  Accordingly, 
because California’s Assembly Bill 1014 does not infringe on a responsible 
citizen’s fundamental right to possess firearms for self-defense, and does not 
wholly regulate an average citizen’s right to bear arms, Assembly Bill 1014 
also survives strict scrutiny analysis.151 
Additionally, courts agree that only regulations substantially burdening 
the right to keep and bear arms trigger heightened, strict scrutiny.152  In 
Decastro, the appellant argued a New York law prohibiting anyone other 
than licensed importers or dealers from transporting a firearm purchased or 
obtained outside that state into the state violates his Second Amendment 
right.153  To analyze whether such burden impinged on the appellant’s right 
to bear arms, the court evaluated the reasonableness of the regulation and 
whether the regulation left open ample alternative channels to obtain a 
firearm.154  A court analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 will also likely consider 
these factors.155  A court should draw from the Decastro court’s reasoning 
when analyzing Assembly Bill 1014 and declare that the law does not burden 
an individual’s Second Amendment right because it burdens one’s ability to 
purchase a firearm in his or her own state for only one year, and therefore, 
the bill provides ample alternatives for firearm possession.156 
 149.  Id. at 635 (stressing the Second Amendment protects the interests of law-
abiding, responsible citizens); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (criticizing Chicago’s regulation because it encroaches and prohibits law-
abiding, responsible citizens from engaging in their Second Amendment rights).  
 150.  Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating if a person poses a significant risk of personal injury to 
himself or herself or others by possessing a firearm, the bill would require law 
enforcement to retain the firearm).  
 151.  See id. (explaining that the inherent right of self-defense for law-abiding citizens 
is central to the Second Amendment). 
 152.  See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting a severe 
burden on the core amendment right will require an extremely strong public-interest 
justification).   
 153.  Id. at 163 (specifying the appellant purchased a firearm in Florida and 
knowingly transported the pistol to New York without applying for a license to possess 
a firearm in New York).   
 154.  See id. at 168; see also Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137 AWI SAB, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172946, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) (stating that a regulation is 
subject to strict scrutiny when the regulation threatens a core Second Amendment right). 
155.  See Cal. A.B. 1014. 
156.  Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168 (emphasizing that one’s residence is the most 
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As the New York state transporting law in Decastro provided adequate 
alternatives for firearm possession, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 also 
provides these same alternatives.157  Critics may argue Assembly Bill 1014 
completely seizes an individual’s firearms, thus, the bill places a blanket ban 
on firearm possession.158  However, such argument is flawed because the bill 
requires that the firearms be only temporarily seized until one can present 
their case to a magistrate.159  Similar to the law in Decastro, Assembly Bill 
1014 does not completely prohibit possession of firearms; rather, the law 
places a strict regulation on firearms from violent, dangerous citizens for a 
temporary period no longer than one year.160  Moreover, at the hearing after 
firearm seizure, the state must meet the heightened burden of proof; 
however, if the court finds that the state does not meet its burden, the 
individual may regain his or her firearms.161  Assembly Bill 1014 satisfies 
strict scrutiny because it requires a hearing before temporarily seizing the 
firearms, does not place a blanket ban on any and all firearm possession, and 
allows for ample alternatives for responsible, law-abiding individuals to 
possess firearms.162 
For a regulation to pass a Second Amendment analysis under strict 
scrutiny, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.163  In Marzzarella, the appellant argued that his conviction under a 
Pennsylvania law prohibiting handguns with obliterated serial numbers 
convenient place to purchase a firearm). 
 157.  Cal. A.B. 1014 (stating the existing law requires police officers to only take 
temporary custody of an individual’s firearms).  
158.  Abigail Wilkinson, CA Bill Would Allow Secret Seizure of Firearms Based on 
Just One Complaint, CNS NEWS (July 10, 2014), 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/abigail-wilkinson/ca-bill-would-allow-secret-seizure-
firearms-based-just-one-complaint (stressing the National Rifle Association claims the 
bill is one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties ever introduced).  
 159. See Cal. A.B. 1014 (emphasizing that at a hearing the magistrate should 
determine the grounds for a gun violence restraining order and determine if the firearms 
should be seized).  
 160.  Compare Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167 (noting laws that place reasonable time, 
manner, and place restrictions that leave ample alternatives as constitutional), with Cal. 
A.B. 1014 (requiring a hearing allows for built in due process to determine whether there 
is probable cause to issue a firearm seizure for no longer than one year). 
 161.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (stressing if the named person is not a risk or if the 
court finds that the state has not met the required standard of proof, the firearms must be 
returned to the named person).  
 162.  See id. (noting that the state has the burden of proving that the individual poses 
a significant risk of safety to himself, herself or to others).  
 163.  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,99-100 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that a law must be the least-restrictive method of serving that interest). 
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violated his right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.164  
The court specified that at its core, the Second Amendment protects the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for 
self-defense for lawful purposes.165  For a law to pass muster under strict 
scrutiny, the court noted that the law must be narrowly tailored towards a 
compelling governmental interest in which it is designed to serve.166  The 
court explained that the state statute protected the governmental interest of 
tracing firearms because it discouraged possession and use of firearms that 
are harder or impossible to trace.167  The court held that the statute was 
narrowly tailored, and therefore, passed under either intermediate or strict 
scrutiny.168  Similar to the law in Marzzarella, California’s Assembly Bill 
1014 is narrowly tailored to support a compelling governmental interest.169 
Like the law in Marzzarella, prohibiting possession of firearms without 
serial numbers narrowly tailored the government’s interest of tracing 
firearms, California’s Assembly Bill 1014 sets forth a detailed procedure 
specifically and narrowly targeting only dangerous individuals.170  Assembly 
Bill 1014 does not place a blanket ban on all individuals; rather, the bill 
narrowly aims at seizing firearms from only those who are proven as a 
significant threat to themselves or others.171  Further, Assembly Bill 1014 
does not allow officials to restrict anyone’s firearms at their discretion, but 
rather, the bill requires the state to use sufficient evidence to prove that the 
 164.  Id. at 88 (stating the law is designed to regulate the commercial sale of firearms 
and to prevent possession by a class of presumptively dangerous individuals). 
 165.  Id. at 92 (stressing that all possession for any purpose is not protected by the 
Second Amendment); see also United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 
2011) (noting that the Second Amendment right, parallel to the First Amendment right, 
is not unlimited and does not protect the right to keep any weapon in any manner for any 
purpose).  
 166.  See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 100 (explaining that a law must be the least-
restrictive method of serving that interest). 
 167.  Id. at 98-101 (emphasizing because firearm serial numbers assist law 
enforcement in gathering vital information the statute serves a compelling government 
interest).  
 168.  Id. at 101 (stressing the law protects the compelling interest of tracing firearms 
by discouraging the possession and use of firearms that are harder or impossible to trace). 
169.  See Cal. A.B. 1014. 
 170.  Compare Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101 (stressing that the statute protects the 
compelling narrow interest of tracing firearms by discouraging possession and use of 
firearms that are impossible to trace), with Cal. A.B. 1014 (seizing firearms from those 
who prove a significant risk of injury to themselves or others to further protect against 
gun violence and mass shootings of notably dangerous individuals).  
 171.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (preventing irresponsible, dangerous individuals 
from possessing or purchasing firearms during a crucial psychological period to avert 
gun violence and mass shootings).  
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named person poses a significant risk of bodily harm to himself, herself, or 
to others.172  Most importantly, Assembly Bill 1014 establishes this 
procedure specifically to deter and prevent gun violence and mass shootings 
in light of the recent Isla Vista shooting.173  Accordingly, California’s 
Assembly Bill 1014 undoubtedly survives heightened strict scrutiny.174 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
As mass shootings continue to devastate our nation, Congress responds by 
proposing stricter gun regulations in attempts to prevent such tragedies.175  
With Assembly Bill 1014, “California goes beyond the federal standard to 
keep guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals.”176  Studies reveal that 
factors leading to gun violence include, “a history of violent crime, 
perpetration of domestic violence, and drug and alcohol abuse.”177  
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 suggests past violence is the best predictor 
of future violence and acts as an effective policy at both a state and federal 
level.178  Instituting an order such as Assembly Bill 1014 nationwide, or even 
state-to-state, would allow for interventions during critical times when a 
person has the potential to be extremely dangerous.179 
 172.  Id. (stressing the magistrate must consider an array of evidence, concluding the 
state met proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before issuing a gun violence restraining 
order and a firearm seizure warrant).  
 173.  Press Release, Cal. State Assembly, supra note 115 (addressing the tragedies of 
the Isla Vista shooting and creating  a procedure to issue gun violence restraining orders). 
 174.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (deterring irresponsible, dangerous individuals 
from possessing or purchasing firearms); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 
(7th Cir. 2011) (specifying that Second Amendment scrutiny necessarily means that the 
government’s actions must be justified under a heightened standard of judicial review).  
175.  Chris Dolmetsch & Edvard Petterson, Connecticut Gun Law Passed After Sandy 
Hook Ruled Legal, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-31/connecticut-gun-law-passed-
after-sandy-hook-ruled-legal?cmpid=yhoo.) (explaining that Connecticut’s ban on 
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, which arose after the Sandy Hook 
shooting, is constitutional).   
 176.  Renee Binder, California Needs a Gun Violence Restraining Order, L.A. TIMES 
(May 26, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-binder-rodgers-gun-
violence-isla-vista-20140527-story.html (explaining California strengthened its laws by 
temporarily banning individual’s guns).  
 177.  See id. (detailing Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm study and arguing that 
past violence may also be a predictor for future violence).  
 178.  Id. (explaining that evidence demonstrates that people who have serious mental 
illness and are not engaging in necessary treatment may be at an elevated risk of 
violence).  
 179.  Id. (explaining that Rodger’s mother voiced her concerns in April, proving that 
family members know when a loved one is in crisis and may have access to firearms to 
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Over the last few decades, our country has endured countless mass 
shooting sprees involving firearms in the hands of mentally disturbed or 
dangerous individuals.180  In light of the Isla Vista shooting, many states, 
such as California and Connecticut, have revised and tightened specific gun 
regulations.181  States should propose regulations similar to California 
Assembly Bill 1014 to prevent future acts of violence by keeping guns out 
of the hands of dangerous individuals, such as Isla Vista shooter Elliott 
Rodger.182 Other states should create such mechanisms, similar to 
California’s bill, which would allow those closest – family member, friend, 
or even a co-worker – to a troubled individual to act when there are warning 
signs or indications that a person is at risk for violence.183  States should push 
bills, such as California’s Assembly Bill 1014, centered on mental health to 
preserve the nation’s mental health and prevent horrific, gruesome events 
such as the Isla Vista mass shooting.184  Not only should states consider such 
legislation, but courts should also prepare to face resistance to emerging gun 
control by considering and establishing the appropriate level of scrutiny they 
will apply to such bills and legislation.185 
V. CONCLUSION 
Though courts have yet to establish the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
do potential harm). 
 180.  Paul Wallin, Should California Adopt a Gun Violence Restraining Order Law, 
BEFORE IT’S NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://beforeitsnews.com/crime-all-
stars/2014/06/should-california-adopt-a-gun-violence-restraining-order-law-
2449994.html; Kindy, supra note 1, at 2 (noting the father of a victim of the UCSB 
shooting stresses Congress needs to act and prevent gun violence).   
181.  See, e.g., George Lauer, ‘Gun Violence Restraining Order’ Idea May Get 
Traction Experts Predict, CAL. HEALTHLINE (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.californiahealthline.org/insight/2014/gun-violence-restraining-order-idea-
may-get-traction-experts-predict (noting after the UCSB shooting, Connecticut Senator 
sought to revive gun laws that were proposed after the Newtown shooting).  
 182.  Ellis & Sidner, supra note 2, at 1 (highlighting the day before the shooting, 
Rodger posted a YouTube video detailing his “day of retribution” where he would punish 
girls); see also Wallin, supra note 180, at 2 (stressing adopting a gun violence restraining 
order will protect the public from future tragedies allowing law enforcement to take 
action).   
 183.  Lauer, supra note 181, at 1 (supporting California’s Assembly Bill 1014, noting 
the idea of giving the people closest to them the ability to intervene and avoid crisis 
makes sense). 
 184.  See id. (recognizing that not all gun violence can be prevented by laws but 
Congress should attempt to pass legislation to make the country safer).   
 185.  See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 
(emphasizing that the Heller Court left many lingering questions for future 
determination). 
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Second Amendment claims, courts continuously and correctly look towards 
the First Amendment for guidance.186  Using the First Amendment, courts 
should consider how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.187  As 
California’s Assembly Bill 1014 surfaces, critics will surely argue that the 
bill fails constitutional muster because it infringes on an individual’s core, 
fundamental Second Amendment right to possess a firearm in the home for 
self-defense.188  However, despite the reasonable restriction Assembly Bill 
1014 places on firearm possession, a close analysis of the bill demonstrates 
that it survives both intermediate and strict scrutiny.189  Assembly Bill 1014 
aims at keeping weapons out of the hands of the most vulnerable, dangerous 
individuals to ultimately prevent mass shootings such as Elliot Rodger’s Isla 
Vista shooting.190  Assembly Bill 1014 goes beyond the federal standard of 
gun control and takes the first step in the right direction by providing 
individuals and law enforcement with a preemptive tool to stop gun violence 
and mass tragedies.191 
 186.  See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining though Heller did not specify the appropriate level of scrutiny, other circuits 
have looked towards the First Amendment as a guide); see also Nordyke v. King, 644 
F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (declaring that regulations trigger strict scrutiny when they 
significantly interfere with exercising a fundamental right). 
 187.  See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (stressing the 
rigor of judicial review will depend on how close the law comes to the core and the 
severity of burden on the Second Amendment).  
 188.  Quiambao, supra note 134, at 1 (highlighting the President of the California 
Association of Federal Firearms Licensees criticizes Assembly Bill 1014 and argues the 
Bill violates individuals’ protected, constitutional rights). 
 189.  See generally Cal. A.B. 1014 (arguing that because the procedure of California’s 
Assembly Bill 1014 is narrowly tailored to prevent gun violence, Assembly Bill 1014 
passes both intermediate and strict scrutiny); see also Quiambao, supra note 134, at 2 
(stressing the bill operates within constitutional bounds and preserves an individual’s 
right to due process). 
 190.  See Cal. A.B. 1014 (targeting only individuals who are a significant threat of 
injury to themselves and others); see also Ellis & Sidner, supra note 2, at 2 (detailing 
Rodger’s video where he told the world he would punish girls for not being attracted to 
him).  
 191.  See Binder, supra note 176, at 1 (highlighting that California’s law goes beyond 
the federal standard to keep guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals). 
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